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THE POTENT AND BROAD-RANGING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING
AND RECORD-KEEPING PROVISIONS OF
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
STUART H. DEMING*
The criminal law of every country makes the corruption of its public
officials a criminal offense.1 Yet, until the latter part of the 20th century,
almost every country limited the prohibitions to its own officials and not
officials of other countries or international organizations.2 This was in spite
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Institutes on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and was a founder and a co-chair of the
ABA's Task Force on International Standards for Corrupt Practices. Mr. Deming received
his B.A., M.B.A., and J.D. from the University of Michigan. He has also been licensed as a
Certified Public Accountant in the State of Michigan.
I See Jefferi Joan Hamilton, Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or
a Problem?, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 134 (1981).
2 That situation has dramatically changed in recent years with the adoption and
implementation of a series of international anti-bribery conventions by much of the
developed world and increasingly by much of the developing world. Following the adoption
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, the United States was for many years the only
country to prohibit improper payments to foreign officials. The adoption in 1997 by the
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development of the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention") led to the implementation by most of the developed world of prohibitions on
improper payments to foreign officials. Nov. 21, 1997, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, reprinted in Argentina-Brazil-Bulgaria-Chile-Slovak Republic-
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37
1.L.M. 1. Much of the rest of the world either has or is in the process of implementing
similar prohibitions through the implementation of the Organization of American States'
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OAS Doc. B-58, reprinted
in Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar.
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, which was adopted in 1996. See also Council of Europe Criminal
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of general, if often unstated, agreement that the proliferation of this form of
corruption threatens the functioning of democratic institutions and market
economies.3
In 1977, as an outgrowth of the Watergate scandal and a series of
revelations associated with that period,4 Congress adopted the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") to deter improper payments to foreign
officials. 5 Yet, in reality, the FCPA's provisions play a far greater role in
legal jurisprudence in the United States and elsewhere than is generally
recognized. Aside from directly affecting business practices of individuals
and entities in international settings, on a daily basis the FCPA bears
directly on the foreign and domestic operations of publicly-held companies
and many foreign companies entering U.S. capital markets. Often, in
unexpected ways, it is increasingly having an impact on litigation and
arbitral proceedings.
6
Law Convention on Corruption ("CoE Criminal Law Convention"), ETS No. 173 27.1.1999,
which was adopted in 1998; and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption ("UN
Convention"), G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003),
reprinted in United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37
(2004), which was adopted in 2003. All of these anti-bribery conventions have now entered
into force.
3 STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 1 (2005).
4 "Beginning in 1973, as a result of the work of the Office of the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, the [Securities and Exchange] Commission became aware of a pattern of conduct
involving the use of corporate funds for illegal domestic political contributions." Promotion
of Reliability of Financial Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-15570, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,959, at 81,960 (Feb. 15, 1979) [hereinafter Exchange
Act].
Subsequent Commission investigations revealed that instances of undisclosed questionable or
illegal corporate payments-both domestic and foreign-were indeed widespread and
represented a serious breach in both the operation of the Commission's system of corporate
disclosure and, correspondingly, in public confidence in the integrity of the system of capital
formation.
Id. More than 400 corporations admitted making questionable payments. H.R. REP. No. 95-
640, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 2 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 342. "The abuses disclosed
run the gamut from bribery of high foreign officials ... to secure some type of favorable
action by a foreign government to so-called facilitating payments . . . to ensure that
government functionaries discharged certain ministrial [sic] or clerical duties." Id.
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2000 & Supp. 2005).6 The FCPA can serve, for example, as a basis in certain situations for not enforcing a
contract. In litigation in U.S. courts and in other common law jurisdictions, the "unclean
hands" doctrine can bar a claim for equitable relief. DEMING, supra note 3, at 381. In some
situations, the doctrine has also been applied to bar a cause of action where a payment may
have been made in violation of the anti-bribery provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78dd-3; see, e.g., Adler v. Federal Republic of Nig., 219 F.3d 869, 876-78 (9th Cir. 2000);
SEDCO Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 1982).
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I. THE FCPA's Two PRINCIPAL MECHANISMS
Initially designed to deter improper payments to foreign officials in
connection with business activities, the FCPA instituted two basic
mechanisms to carry out its purposes. One is a set of prohibitions on
payments to foreign officials.7 These are generally referred to as the "anti-
bribery provisions." The anti-bribery provisions first come to mind when
reference is made to the FCPA. They prohibit any promise, offer, or
payment of anything of value if the offeror "knows" that any portion will be
offered, given, or promised to a foreign official, foreign political party, or
candidate for public office for the purpose of influencing a governmental
decision.8
The second mechanism is comprised of a set of provisions known as
the "accounting and record-keeping provisions."' 9 Through the accounting
and record-keeping provisions, the FCPA placed new and significant
affirmative obligations on entities subject to its terms to maintain systems
of internal controls and to maintain records that accurately reflect
transactions and dispositions of assets.1l These provisions directly affect
business practices unrelated to the making of improper payments to foreign
officials. In so doing, they directly affect the worldwide operations of
entities subject to their terms and extend to their majority-owned
subsidiaries and officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and agents
acting on their behalf."
In the context of international arbitration, arbitral tribunals and courts enforcing or
annulling arbitral awards are increasingly confronted with situations where the enforcement
of a contract or of an award relating to a contract may be barred due to improper payments in
conjunction with the contract. DEMING, supra note 3, at 381. Over the years, arbitrators
have asserted the existence of "an international public order which makes bribery contracts
invalid and contrary to bonos mores." A. Timothy Martin, International Arbitration and
Corruption: An Evolving Standard, INT'L ENERGY & MIN. ARB., MIN. LAW SERIES (2002).
Some tribunals have found national laws to also hold such contracts illegal.
Until the recent adoption of the anti-bribery conventions, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text, no specific reference to international law could be made. DEMING, supra
note 3, at 381. That has now changed. There can be little question that an agreement to pay
a bribe is contrary to customary international law and not just a breach of moral standards.
Arbitrators can accordingly be expected to be more and more confronted with arguments of
this nature by parties challenging the enforcement of a contract where allegations of
improper payments exist. Id.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3.
8Id.
9 Id. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(4)-(7), 78ff(a).
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494.
11 See, e.g., DEMING, supra note 3, at 21; Arthur F. Matthews, Defending SEC and DOJ
FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton
STUART H. DEMING
The two mechanisms are conceptually different from one another. The
anti-bribery provisions are proscriptive whereas the accounting and record-
keeping provisions are prescriptive in nature. 2 Their scope and application
also differ. Each set of provisions must be considered separately, and
neither provision should be considered alone.13  They were intended to
work in "tandem" and thereby complement one another.' 4 A certain set of
facts may suggest a violation of the anti-bribery provisions. At the same
time, the same set of facts may not suggest a violation of the accounting and
record-keeping provisions.
II. THE EXPANSIVE NATURE OF THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-
KEEPING PROVISIONS
The FCPA's accounting and record-keeping provisions constitute the
FCPA's second and less-known mechanism for deterring improper
payments to foreign officials. While their application is ostensibly limited
to issuers, 5 the accounting and record-keeping provisions constitute the far
more potent mechanism. Unlike the anti-bribery provisions, they are not
limited to the making of improper payments to foreign officials. The
accounting and record-keeping provisions "have a much broader reach.
16
They apply to all aspects of the practices relating to the preparation of the
financial statements of an entity subject to their terms. 17
The accounting and record-keeping provisions go far beyond simply
addressing the bribery of foreign officials. One of the problems disclosed
by the revelations of the Watergate era in the United States was the
accounting and record-keeping practices that made improper payments
Energy/indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 303, 349
(1998) (citing 2 KATHLEEN F. BRIcKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 9:20, at 279
(1992)).
12 DEMING, supra note 3, at 6.
13 Id.
14 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3, 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. For
example, the Senate report associated with the FCPA's passage stated that "a U.S. company
'which looks the other way' in order to be able to raise the defense that they were ignorant of
bribes made by a foreign subsidiary, could be in violation of [the accounting and record-
keeping provisions] requiring companies to devise and maintain adequate accounting
controls." Id. at 11.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 39-47, for discussion of what constitutes an issuer
for purposes of the accounting and record-keeping provisions.
t6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 348 (5th ed. 2005).
17 See infra Section V, for discussion as to the scope of the record-keeping provisions,
especially as they may relate to records not directly related to the preparation of financial
statements.
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possible. 18 To address these practices, the accounting and record-keeping
provisions placed new and significant obligations on the worldwide
operations of all entities subject to its terms to maintain records that
accurately reflect transactions and dispositions of assets and to maintain
systems of internal accounting controls. 19
"Congress believed that almost all such bribery was covered up in the
corporation's books, and that to require proper accounting methods and
internal accounting controls would discourage corporations from engaging
in illegal payments. Congress recognized that both investors and the
corporation itself would benefit from accurate bookkeeping.,
20
Although one of the major substantive provisions of the FCPA is to require corporate
disclosure of assets as a deterrent to foreign bribes, the more significant addition of
the FCPA is the accounting controls or "books and records" provision, which gives
the SEC authority over the entire financial management and reporting requirements of
publicly-held United States corporations.
2 1
Congress recognized at the time of the FCPA's consideration that the
accounting provisions would have an effect extending beyond
"questionable payments" made in connection with foreign business. 22 The
SEC report proposing the legislation concerning accounting and record-
keeping practices, which was in large part ultimately adopted as part of the
FCPA, 3 stated that questionable payments "cast doubt on the integrity and
18 See supra note 4. One of the "key conclusions" drawn from the SEC investigations
during that period was that
[t]he almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed to date by the Commission has been
the apparent frustration of our system of corporate accountability which has been designed to
assure that there is proper accounting of the use of corporate funds and that documents filed with
the Commission and circulated to shareholders do not omit or misrepresent material facts.
Millions of dollars of funds have been inaccurately recorded in corporate books to facilitate the
making of questionable payments. Such falsification of records has been known to corporate
employees and often to top management, but often has been concealed from outside auditors and
counsel and outside directors.
Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4 (citing Report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices, submitted to S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs 3 (May 12, 1976)
[hereinafter Questionable Payments Report]).
19 See DEMING, supra note 3, at 21; Matthews, supra note 11, at 349.
20 Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (citing S. REP. No. 95-
114).
21 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
22 GARY LYNCH, ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at 1 (1983), reprinted in 2 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. 260.001.
23 Questionable Payments Report, supra note 18, at 63-69. The proposed language for a
new § 78m(b)(2) was identical to what later became § 78m(b)(2) under § 102 of the FCPA.
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reliability of the corporate books and records which are the very foundation
for the disclosure system established by the federal securities laws. ' 4 The
report went on to state that "[i]mplicit in the requirement to file accurate
financial statements is the requirement that they be based on adequate and
truthful books and records. The integrity of corporate books and records is
essential to the entire reporting systems administered by the SEC. 25
Critics of the accounting provisions recognized that the effect of the
SEC's proposal would apply to more than foreign payments.26 A
representative of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
testified that the SEC proposal
goes far beyond the problem of illegal corporate payments in establishing a required
corporate structure of corporate accountability and by making it illegal to distort
proper recordkeeping. The proposed amendment would, for the first time, involve the
SEC on a broad basis in corporate activities which do not involve filings with the
Commission or transactions in securities.
2 7
Despite these concerns, "Congress interjected itself into this process
by establishing accounting standards for regulated companies and requiring
them to implement a system of accounting controls to insure that the
accounting standards are met.",28  The adoption of the accounting and
record-keeping provisions "reflect[ed] a congressional determination that
the scope of the federal securities laws and the SEC's authority should be
expanded beyond the traditional ambit of disclosure requirements."
2 9
That congressional determination as to the expansive nature of the
accounting and record-keeping provisions has not waned over time. At the
core of the heightened obligations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494. While the
proposed language for new §§ 78m(b)(3) and § 78m(b)(4) were not included in § 102, id.,
both provisions, with one modification, later became Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2; see
Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4. Unlike the proposed §
78m(b)(4), Questionable Payments Report, supra note 18, at 64, the modification restricted
the application of Rule 13b2-2 to officers and directors. Exchange Act Release No. 13,185
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,896, at 87,382 (Jan. 19, 1977).
Indeed, the SEC proposed what later became Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-1 nearly a year before
the adoption of the FCPA. See id.; cf infra note 103.
24 Questionable Payments Report, supra note 18, at 3.
25 Id.
26 LYNCH, supra note 22, at 2.
27 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings on H.R. 13481, S. 3664, H.R. 13870 and H.R.
13953 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 18 (1976).
28 Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
29 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
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("Sarbanes-Oxley") are those that relate to the accounting and record-
keeping provisions of the FCPA. 30 As a result of the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley,3 ' issuers are required to include in their annual reports an internal
control report expressing management's responsibility for establishing and
maintaining adequate internal controls for financial reporting and assessing
their effectiveness.32 An issuer's outside auditor is required to provide an
attestation with management's assessment of the adequacy of the issuer's
internal controls. 33  Sarbanes-Oxley also expanded the record-keeping
provisions to address a broader range of conduct than simply a material
misstatement or omission.34
Significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley increased the maximum penalty for a
single criminal violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions
by an individual to twenty years.35 Fines for a violation were increased to
$5 million for an individual and $25 million for an entity.36 In contrast, the
penalties for a violation of the anti-bribery provisions are far less severe.
37
30 See, e.g., Alan L. Beller, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Speech by SEC Staff: Investors, the Stock Market, and Sarbanes-Oxley's New Section 404
Requirements (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch01 1205alb.htm.
31 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
32 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
33 Id. § 7262(b).
34 Id. § 7242(a); see infra Section V.A.2, for a discussion of Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13b2-2(b) (2005). In addition, informants were given added protection by Sarbanes-
Oxley. It is now a criminal offense for any individual or entity to knowingly retaliate against
any person for providing information relating to the commission or possible commission of a
federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2000 & Supp. 2005). "Retaliation" under the statute
can consist of "interfering with the lawful employment or livelihood" of an informant. Id
Along these same lines, new criminal statutes were added for the destruction, alteration, or
falsification of records to impede a federal investigation or in anticipation of such an
investigation and for the destruction of audit records in violation of rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC. Id. § § 1519-20.
35 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). Initially, the maximum penalty was a maximum term of
imprisonment of five years and fine of $100,000 for individuals and $500,000 for entities. It
was later increased in 1988 to a maximum often years and $1 million fines for individuals
and $2.5 million fines for entities. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680. Sarbanes-Oxley raised the maximum
penalties to their current levels. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106, 116 Stat. at 810.
36 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
37 Violations of the accounting and record-keeping provisions are subject to the standard
SEC enforcement consequences including injunctions, civil penalty actions, and
administrative proceedings. Id §§ 78u, 78u-3. Civil enforcement actions under the
accounting and record-keeping provisions are subject to a civil penalty of $10,000. Id. §
78ff(c)(1)(B).
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The maximum period of imprisonment for an individual is five years and
38
the maximum fine for a criminal violation by an entity is $2 million.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-
KEEPING PROVISIONS
The accounting and record-keeping provisions are narrower in the
scope of their application than the anti-bribery provisions. They apply to
issuers of securities, as defined by § 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"),39 which are required by the Exchange Act to
register under § 12 or file reports under § 15(d) or which have filed a
registration statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities
Act of 1933.40
As a practical matter, unless otherwise exempted, an issuer subject to
the terms of the accounting and record-keeping provisions includes the
following categories of entities41:
" Entities with securities listed on a national securities exchange,
including the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System42;
" Entities with assets in excess of $1 million and more than 500
shareholders and that are engaged in interstate commerce, in a
business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are
traded by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce43;
* Financial institutions that issue securities and that are insured
in accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 44;
" Entities offering a registration statement that has not yet
become effective under the Securities Act of 1933 and that has
not been withdrawn45;
" Foreign entities required to file reports under § 15(d) of the
Exchange Act.46
38 Id. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff(c).
39 Id. § 78c(a)(8).
40 Id. §§ 77a-77c, 78o(d), 781.
41 Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, the term "issuer" will be used in this article to
refer to entities subject to the terms of the accounting and record-keeping provisions.
42 15 U.S.C. § 781(b).
41 id. § 781(g)(1)(B).
" Id. § 781(i).
45 Id. § 77a-77c.
46 Id. § 78o(d).
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In addition, at least with respect to keeping accurate books and records
under the record-keeping provisions, an issuer can include a privately-held
entity for the periods for which it is required to submit financial statements
as part of a registration under the Exchange Act.47
A. FOREIGN ENTITIES
Issuers can include foreign entities that are required under the
Exchange Act to register pursuant to § 12 or to file reports pursuant to §
15(d).4 8 Issuers can also include foreign entities with American Depository
Receipts ("ADRs") listed on a national exchange, including the
NASDAQ.49 ADRs represent an ownership interest in the securities of a
foreign private issuer that are deposited, usually outside of the United
States, with a financial institution as the depository. 50
47 United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 355-56 (D.D.C. 1997); see
Matthews, supra note 11, at 392 ("[A] 'private' company that later (within two years)
becomes a public company, can, by falsifying its 'private' books and records, trigger a
subsequent criminal prosecution of the 'public' company for false books and records.").
48 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(d), 781. This can include foreign entities that do not intend to sell
their securities in the United States:
[A] foreign private issuer that has $10 million or more in assets at the end of its most recent
fiscal year is required to register any class of equity securities if any such class is held of record
by 500 or more persons worldwide, including 300 or more in the United States.
DONALD ZARIN, DOING BusINEss UNDER THE FCPA 4-3, n. 7 (PLI 2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
781(g); 17 C.F.R. §§ 12g3-2(a) (2001)). "A foreign issuer can avoid this registration
requirement by applying for an exemption with the SEC under Rule 12g3-2(b) of the
Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-3(b) (2001)." Id.
49 ZARIN, supra note 48, at 4-3, n. 7.
50 ADRs are negotiable certificates issued by a U.S. bank or trust company. Mark
Saunders, American Depositary Receipts: An Introduction to U.S. Capital Markets for
Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48, 49 (1993). Unless an exemption is
available, ADRs must be registered under the Securities Act before they may be publicly
distributed within the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1). "[T]he public offering of ADRs
is no different than the public offering of ordinary shares in many respects, from a legal
point of view." Frode Jensen, III, The Attractions of the US. Securities Markets to Foreign
Issuers and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From a Legal
Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S25, S29 (1994). The legislative history of U.S.
securities laws reflect the intent to treat foreign private issuers the same as domestic issuers.
Saunders, supra, at 59 (citing R. Adee, Offerings by Foreign Private Issuers, in SECURITIES
UNDERWRITING-PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 413, 428 (K. Bialkin et al. eds, PLI 1985)). "[T]he
more voluntary steps a foreign company has taken to enter U.S. capital markets, the degree
of regulation and amount of disclosure more closely approaches the regulation of domestic
registrants." Id. at 60 (quoting Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers,
Securities Act Release No. 6360 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,054, at 84,651 (Dec. 2, 1981)).
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B. SUBSIDIARIES
Unlike the anti-bribery provisions, the accounting and record-keeping
provisions apply directly to the operations of majority-owned foreign
subsidiaries of an issuer.5 1 However, the accounting and record-keeping
provisions are not necessarily applicable to domestic or foreign entities if
the issuer holds an interest of 50% or less in the foreign entity.52 When an
issuer does not have an interest greater than 50%, it must "proceed in good
faith to use its influence to the extent reasonable under the circumstances to
cause [the affiliate] to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls" consistent with the requirements of the accounting and record-
keeping provisions. 53  In such circumstances, it will be "conclusively
presumed" to have fulfilled its statutory obligation when it can demonstrate
its good faith efforts to influence its subsidiary.
54
In determining whether good faith efforts are exercised, the relevant
circumstances "include the relative degree of the issuer's ownership of the
domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the business
operations of the country in which such firm is located., 55 The degree of
effective control can be expected to bear directly on the evaluation of
whether an issuer's efforts are sufficient to demonstrate good faith on its
part.56 An issuer's duty to influence a subsidiary's behavior increases
51 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). The anti-bribery provisions do not directly apply to foreign
subsidiaries, including wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries. See H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 14
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120. However, in the latter situation, a parent can
be held vicariously liable for the conduct of a subsidiary if it has sufficient knowledge and in
some way authorizes or acquiesces in the conduct of the foreign subsidiary. See infra
Section IV; cf H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 14; S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.




56 The House Conference Report associated with the 1988 amendments to the FCPA,
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 §§ 5001-5003, 102
Stat. 1415-1425 [hereinafter OTCA Conf. Rep.], in explaining the addition of Section
13(b)(6) to the Exchange Act, explained,
[T]hat it is unrealistic to expect a minority owner to exert a disproportionate degree of influence
over the accounting practices of a subsidiary. The amount of influence which an issuer may
exercise necessarily varies from case to case. While the relative degree of ownership is
obviously one factor, other factors may also be important in determining whether an issuer has
demonstrated good-faith efforts to use its influence.
H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 917 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1950.
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directly with the degree to which it can exercise control over the
subsidiary.5 7
C. CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS
In general, while acting within the scope of their employment or
responsibilities on behalf an issuer, individuals, and in particular, officers,
directors, employees, stockholders and agents of an issuer can be subject to
the terms of the accounting and record-keeping provisions. Depending
upon the circumstances, individuals can be directly subject to the terms of
the accounting and recording-keeping provisions.5 8  The one major
exception relates to violations of Rule 13b2-2 relating to disclosures to
auditors. Rule 13b2-2 is only directly applicable to officers and directors.
Yet anyone acting on their behalf could be liable as an accomplice.
59
57 Id The SEC has taken action where an issuer has less than 50% control. In Sec. &
Exch. Comm 'n v. BellSouth Corp., BellSouth consented to the entry of judgment directing it
to pay a $150,000 civil penalty for violating the FCPA's record-keeping and internal controls
provisions. Litigation Release No. 17,310 (Jan: 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lr17310.htm. In the accompanying administrative proceeding, In re
BellSouth Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 45,279 (Jan. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-45279.htm, BellSouth was found to have violated
the internal control provisions. BellSouth's Nicaraguan subsidiary, Telefonia Celular de
Nicaragua, S.A.'s ("Telefonia"), improperly recorded payments to the wife of a Nicaraguan
legislator who chaired a committee with oversight over the legislation that would enable
BellSouth to acquire a majority interest in Telefonia. Id. Initially, BellSouth purchased a
49% interest in Telefonia with an option to purchase another 40% interest. Id. However,
Nicaraguan law prohibited foreign ownership of 50% or greater interest in
telecommunication companies. Id. In spite of her lack of legislative experience, she was
retained and ultimately paid $60,000. Id. BellSouth International, an indirectly wholly-
owned subsidiary of BellSouth, knew that payments to the lobbyist could implicate the
FCPA. Id. Nonetheless, a BellSouth International attorney approved Telefonia's retention
of the legislator's wife. Id. BellSouth was found to have "held less than 50 percent of the
voting power of Telefonia, but through its operational control, had the ability to cause
Telefonia to comply with the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions."
Id. BellSouth was found to have failed to devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls at Telefonia sufficient to detect and prevent FCPA violations. Id. In
terms of the adequacy of inteml controls, including a compliance program, it should also be
noted that BellSouth International officials "knew or should have known that the attorney
lacked sufficient experience or training to enable him properly to opine on the matter." Id.
In that same proceeding, BellSouth was also found to have violated the record-keeping
provisions for actions on the part of its Venezuela subsidiary, Telcel, C.A. Id. Telcel
recorded payments totaling $10.8 million to six offshore companies based on fictitious
invoices for services rendered. Id. During the period, BellSouth had a majority interest in
Telcel. Id.
58 See infra Section V.A.1, for discussion of Rule 13b2-1.
59 See infra Section IV.A.3, for discussion relative to being an accomplice, and Section
IV.B.3, for discussion relative to aiding and abetting.
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IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-
KEEPING PROVISIONS
An individual or entity can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of
a third party when the third party is acting for or on behalf of the individual
or entity. Classic examples of third parties that can serve as a basis for
third-party liability include agents, consultants, and representatives acting
on behalf of an issuer. Even if a third party is not subject to the accounting
and record-keeping provisions, an individual or entity can become subject
to vicarious liability if the individual or entity authorizes, directs, or in
some way ratifies conduct prohibited by the accounting and record-keeping
provisions. Depending upon whether criminal or civil charges are brought,
the knowledge requirement for establishing vicarious liability can vary
dramatically.
A. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In 1988, Congress clarified the knowledge requirement under the
accounting and record-keeping provisions. Section 13(b) of the Exchange
Act was amended to add the following provisions:
(4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with the requirements
of paragraph (2) of this subsection except as provided in paragraph (5) of this
subsection.
(5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of
internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account
described in paragraph (2).60
For criminal liability to be imposed for acts of third parties, an issuer
must have knowledge that the third party intends to circumvent or has
circumvented the internal controls or falsified books and records.6'
Especially when an issuer becomes aware of the existence of questionable
circumstances, as with the anti-bribery provisions and many other federal
criminal statutes, proof of deliberate ignorance or knowing disregard can
establish the requisite knowledge.62 Depending upon the nature of the
relationship and the surrounding circumstances, acquiescence can constitute
60 OTCA Conf. Rep., supra note 56, § 5002; 102 Stat. at 1415; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(4)-
(b)(5).
61 Id.
62 E.g., United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see United States v. Manrique Aribizo, 833
F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (lst Cir. 1987);
United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. McAllister, 747
F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984).
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authorization.63 For example, conscious acquiescence to a series of
unauthorized acts could be found to constitute authorization to engage in
similar acts.64
1. Knowledge on the Part of Juridical Entities
The knowledge requirement under U.S. law for a juridical person-or
entity-is distinctly different from that for a natural person. No one person
within an entity has to have all of the requisite knowledge.65 Nor is there a
requirement that there be knowledge on the part of senior members of
66management. Regardless of how disparate the knowledge may be within
an entity, the collective knowledge of employees of the entity acting within
the scope of their employment can serve as the basis for establishing
knowledge under U.S. law.6 7 In essence, the sum of the knowledge of an
entity's officers, directors, employees, and agents, when acting within the
scope of their employment or responsibilities, establishes knowledge on the
part of an entity.68
Actions on the part of isolated members of management or on the part
of low-level employees could expose an issuer to criminal liability under
the accounting and record-keeping provisions. Even more likely is the
prospect of employees or isolated members of management having
63 See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 34 (1998) (citing United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of
Tex., 427 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342,
342-43 (3d Cir. 1948)); cf United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1975).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991) (A
corporation may be held criminally liable "for the conduct of its supervisory employees who
had either intentionally disregarded the law or had acted with plain indifference to its
requirements" (quoting United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1978)); Armour
& Co., 168 F.2d. at 342-43 (a corporation can be found liable for acts of its employees even
where the corporation cautioned against such conduct but did not diligently check and
eliminate such practices).
65 E.g., United States v. T.I.M.E-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974)
("[A] corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by
several employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who then would have
comprehended its full import."); Joseph S. Hall, Corporate Criminal Liability, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 549, 555 (1998) ("Federal courts have found corporations liable even when there
was no single employee at fault.").
66 See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983) (rejecting arguments that a corporation can only be accountable for acts
of high managerial agents); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 1981).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (lst Cir. 1987);
Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958).
68 E.g., Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d at 856 ("The aggregate ... constitutes the
corporation's knowledge of a particular operation.").
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knowledge of prohibited conduct being undertaken by third parties on
behalf of an issuer. In such circumstances, their failure to register an
objection or to disavow the prohibited conduct may be interpreted as
constituting an authorization or acquiescence on the part of the entity.
69
2. Agents
Actions by an agent of an issuer or of an individual subject to the
terms of the accounting and record-keeping provisions can subject the
issuer or individual to vicarious liability. Basic agency principles apply.
The critical factor is whether the agent is acting within the scope of his
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the issuer or
individual.7v If a foreign entity is deemed to be an agent of an issuer, the




In a criminal context, to the degree that they may be complicit,
privately-held entities and individuals not affiliated with an issuer can be
held vicariously liable for violations of the accounting and record-keeping
provisions. They do not need to be directly subject to the terms of the
accounting and record-keeping provisions.
a. Aiding and Abetting
Vicarious liability can arise out of an individual's or entity's
involvement as an accomplice under the federal aiding and abetting
69 See supra note 64.
70 See, e.g., Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at 572-73.
71 "An issuer that learns that a controlled foreign affiliate may have engaged in
questionable accounting and record-keeping practices has the same responsibilities as an
issuer would have in learning of improper accounting and record-keeping practices of its
own employees." DEMING, supra note 3, at 36. The questionable conduct "must be
repudiated" in a clear and unambiguous manner. Id. Measures should be undertaken to
determine what occurred and, where appropriate, take remedial action to prevent its
recurrence. The response should be sufficient to satisfy enforcement officials as to the
adequacy of the response should questions later arise. Id. In the absence of an adequate
response, the questionable conduct may be deemed to have been ratified. Id.
An issuer with a non-controlling interest may become aware of the improper conduct
on the part of its subsidiary. This is more likely to occur if the issuer is actively involved in
the operations or activities of the affiliate. For example, by having its own representatives
on the board of directors or as members of management, an issuer is more likely to have
knowledge of what is taking place and, therefore, more likely to be viewed as authorizing the
conduct in question. Id. at 33.
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72statute. An individual's or entity's knowledge coupled with actions that
aid or abet a violation can lead to criminal liability in connection with
73prohibited conduct on the part of a third party. In essence, to be liable as
an accomplice, an individual or entity must act with intent that the offense
be committed.7 4 Someone found guilty of aiding and abetting is punishable
as the principal7 5  This would mean that an individual who aided and
abetted a violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions could
be subject to twenty years of imprisonment.76
b. Conspiracy
A conspiracy is established when two or more persons combine or
agree to violate a federal statute and an affirmative act is taken by one of
the persons in furtherance of the conspiracy.77 No offer or payment needs
to be made, no record needs to be falsified, and no system of internal
controls needs to be circumvented. The agreement to violate the accounting
and record-keeping provisions combined with an overt act by one of the co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy serve as the basis for the
criminal charge.78
72 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). In discussing the proposed provision relating to prohibitions
against falsification of accounting records and deceptions of auditors, the Senate Report
made specific reference to "[c]oncepts of aiding and abetting" being applicable to these
provisions. S. REP. No. 95-117, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569. The
House receded to the Senate in agreeing to these provisions with one unrelated modification.
See infra note 103.
73 E.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (quoting United States
v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 401 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.)); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d
345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that in
order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the defendant must share the principal's
intent and engage in some affirmative conduct to aid the venture); United States v.
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 546 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is necessary that the alleged aider and
abettor associate himself with the unlawful venture and participate in it with the intent that
its illegal objective be attained.") (citing United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1976)).
75 Medina, 528 F.2d at 532.
76 See supra text accompanying note 35.
77 18 U.S.C. § 371. An individual convicted of conspiracy can be subjected to a term of
imprisonment of five years. Id.
78 The implications for an individual or entity cannot be overstated. So long as the
requisite knowledge exists, rather casual interchanges or seemingly insignificant acts have
the prospect of forming a basis for a conspiracy or an aiding and abetting charge. Relatively
insignificant activity can constitute an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. For example,
acquiescence combined with other affirmative acts of a very minor nature, like sending an e-
mail, could form the basis for allegations of conspiring to violate the record-keeping
provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 403 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2005); cf
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B. CIVIL LIABILITY
Implicitly, in a civil context, the accounting and record-keeping
provisions provide for vicarious liability based upon common law
principles of agency and respondeat superior. Unlike the anti-bribery
provisions, a civil enforcement action does not require knowledge to
establish a violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions.79 An
issuer can be held strictly liable for actions taken by an officer, director,
employee, shareholder, or agent acting on behalf of the issuer. Civil
liability can be established without proving that the issuer knew or even
suspected wrongful conduct by someone acting within the scope of their
duties or responsibilities and on behalf of the issuer.
1. Subsidiaries
As previously discussed 80 an issuer can also be held vicariously liable
for the conduct of a domestic or foreign subsidiary. When an issuer has an
interest greater than 50%, it makes no difference whether the issuer lacks
knowledge of the conduct that serves as the basis for a violation.81 Where
an issuer has an interest of 50% or less, an issuer can also be vicariously
liable for conduct for which it has no knowledge if it can be demonstrated
that an issuer has not proceeded "in good faith to use its influence, to the
extent reasonable under the issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic
or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls consistent with [the accounting and record-keeping provisions].,
82
2. Control Person Liability
Although contrary authority exists as to its applicability to SEC
enforcement actions,83 another theory of vicarious liability employed by the
SEC is known as "control person" liability under § 20(a) of the Exchange
United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981);
Bartoli v United States, 192 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1951).
79 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
("There is no scienter requirement; liability is predicated on 'standards of reasonableness."'
(citing Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4)).
80 See supra Section II.B, for additional discussion relative to subsidiaries.
81 See OTCA Conf. Rep., supra note 56, at 917.
82 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). "Such circumstances include the relative degree of the
issuer's ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the
business operations of the country in which such firm is located." Id. By implication, these
circumstances are not exclusive and may well include a number of other factors. OTCA
Conf. Rep., supra note 56, at 917.
83 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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Act.84 Control person liability was enacted to "expand, rather than restrict,
the scope of liability under the securities laws. ' 85 Control person liability
does not supplant common law principles of agency and respondeat
superior. 86  Congress defined control "in a broad fashion.., to reach
prospective wrongdoers, rather than to permit the escape of those who
would otherwise be responsible for the acts of their employees. ' 'g7
To establish control person liability, a primary violation by the
controlled person must be established as well as control of the primary
violator.88  Culpability in some "meaningful sense" by the controlling
person must also be established.8 9 "Control over a primary violator may be
established by showing that the defendant possessed 'the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."' 90 Once
a prima facie violation of § 20(a) is established, the burden shifts to the
control person to demonstrate that he acted in good faith, 91 and that he "did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation.'
92
84 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); see, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d
1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996). Control person liability has been alleged in enforcement actions
brought by the SEC involving violations of the anti-bribery and accounting and record
keeping provisions. In Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy, the SEC filed a civil injunctive
action against Douglas A. Murphy and David G. Kay, two former officers of an issuer,
American Rice, Inc. Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy, No. H-02-2908 (S.D.
Tex. July 30, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17651.htm.
Kay was alleged to have authorized over $500,000 in bribery payments to Haitian customs
officials. Id. 1, 22-23, 25, 27. The scheme was directed by Kay and included preparing
false shipping records and recording the bribe payments as routine business expenditures.
Id. 1, 22-23, 29. Despite his knowledge or reckless disregard of Kay's activities and
control over Kay, id. 1, 10, 30-31, 33, 35-36, Murphy took no action to stop the payments
or the preparation of the false records. Murphy was alleged to be liable as a control person
for Kay's conduct in violating the anti-bribery and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.
Id. 3, 39-42, 46.
85 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975)
(citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 737-39 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968)); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971)).
86 Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980).
87 Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d at 812-13 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 26
(1934)).
88 First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1472 (citing Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1980)).
89 Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
90 First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1472-73 (quoting from 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2
(1996)).
91 See Marbury Management, Inc., 629 F.2d at 716; Burr, 506 F.2d at 1086.
92 15 U.S.C. § 78(t) (2000).
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3. Aiding and Abetting
An entity or individual can also be vicariously liable in a civil context
for aiding and abetting a violation of the accounting and record-keeping
provisions. 93 However, unlike an individual or entity directly subject to the
accounting and record-keeping violations, an individual or entity must
"knowingly provide substantial assistance" to be liable as an aider and
abettor.94
V. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-
KEEPING PROVISIONS
The accounting and record-keeping provisions require issuers to
maintain accurate records of their transactions and of the disposition of their
assets. Unlike the anti-bribery provisions, which apply only to transactions
involving payments to foreign officials, the accounting and record-keeping
provisions apply without regard to whether foreign conduct, foreign
officials, or improper payments are involved. They apply to an issuer's
domestic and foreign operations and create an affirmative duty on the part
of issuers as well as officers, directors, employees, and agents or
stockholders acting on the issuer's behalf.
The record-keeping provisions require an issuer to "make and keep
books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.
' 95
"Reasonable detail" is "such level of detail and degree of assurance as
would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs., 96 In
adopting the FCPA, the conferees added this qualification out of "concern
that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude
and precision which is unrealistic.,
97
" Id. § 78t(e).
94 Id. Aiding and abetting has been alleged in a civil context in conjunction with
violations of the anti-bribery and accounting and record keeping provisions. In Sec. & Exch.
Comm 'n v. Murphy, Kay was alleged to have aided and abetted American Rice's violations
of the internal control provisions and Murphy and Kay were alleged to have aided and
abetted a violation of the anti-bribery provisions. Complaint at 48-49, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Murphy, No. H-02-2908 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp 17651 .htm.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
96 Id. § 78m(b)(7).
97 H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120.
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Under the accounting section no off-the-books fund could be lawfully
maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no
improper payment could be lawfully disguised.98
Whether or not a particular situation involves bribery by the corporation or by an
individual acting on his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including
the position of the employee, the care with which management supervises employees
in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict accounting standards set forth
under [the accounting and record-keeping provisions].
99
A. FALSIFICATION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS
Under the record-keeping provisions of the FCPA, an issuer's
management has the responsibility of ensuring that its books and records
are accurate so that financial statements can be prepared in conformity with
accepted methods of recording economic events.'00
The "books and records" provision, contained in section 13(b)(2)(A) of the FCPA has
three basic objectives: (1) books and records should reflect transactions in conformity
with accepted methods of reporting economic events, (2) misrepresentation,
concealment, falsification, circumvention, and other deliberate acts resulting in in-
accurate financial books and records are unlawful, and (3) transactions should be
properly reflected on books and records in such a manner as to permit the preparation
of financial statements in conformity with GAAP and other criteria applicable to such
statements. 101
In carrying out the terms of record-keeping provisions of the FCPA,
the SEC adopted two rules to strengthen the accuracy of corporate books
and records and the reliability of the audit process.'0 2 Congress was aware
of the SEC's intention to implement these rules prior to adopting the
FCPA.' °3
98 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
99 Id. (emphasis added).
100 See H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120.
10 Id. at 748 (citing Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, American Bar
Association, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307 (1978) [hereinafter Guide]).
102 Cf S. REP. No. 95-114, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
103 The legislative history indicates that Congress was aware of the SEC's intention to
implement rules prohibiting the falsification of books and records and making false
statements to accountants:
The Senate bill contained provisions to make it unlawful for (1) any person to knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account required to be made for any accounting purpose, and (2) any person
knowingly to make a materially false or misleading statement or to omit to state or cause another
person to omit any material fact necessary in order to make statement to an accountant not
misleading.
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1. Rule 13b2-1
Rule 13b2-1 prohibits the falsification of books and records required to
be kept under the record-keeping provisions. 10 4 It states that "[n]o person
shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record,
or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange
Act."' 105  It applies to "any person" and is not limited to officers and
directors of a company or anyone acting on behalf of an issuer.' 
06
The House amendment contained no comparable provisions because the SEC had already
published for comment rules designed to accomplish similar objectives under its existing
authority.
The Senate receded to the House. Although these provisions were supportive of the basic
accounting section, the use of the "knowingly" standard has become involved in an issue never
intended to be raised or resolved by the Senate bill - namely, whether or not the inclusion or
deletion of the word "knowingly" would Or would not affirm, expand, or overrule the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder (425 U.S. 185). As stated clearly in the
Committee report on S. 305, these provisions were to be severable from the rest of the securities
laws.
Under the circumstances, the conferees determined the best method of proceeding was to retain
only new section 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The conferees further
decided that this legislation should not be converted into a debate on the important issues raised
by the Hochfelder decision.
In deleting the Senate provisions, the conferees intend that no inference should be drawn with
respect to any rulemaking authority the SEC may or may not have under the securities laws.
H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 10-11.
104 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2005).
105 Id.
106 SEC. v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 865-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The addition of§
13(b)(5) to the Exchange Act in the 1988 Amendments resolves any question as to the
application of the accounting and record-keeping to any person. See Matthews, supra note
11, at 350-5 1. Section 13(b)(5) provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or
knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account described in [§ 13(b)(2)]." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2000).
In implementing the record-keeping provisions, the SEC found that
(t]he effect of falsifications of books, records or accounts, in making reports required under
Section 13 misleading or incomplete, is not necessarily contingent on the identity of the
wrongdoers or on whether he acts with the knowledge or acquiescence of management.
Moreover, while normally only officers and employees of the issuer are in a position to falsify
corporate records, it is not feasible to identify in the Rule all categories of persons who might
violate it. Consequently, the Commission believes that the rule should apply to any person who,
in fact, does cause corporate books and records to be falsified.
Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4.
"The SEC has consistently taken the position that it can bring civil and administrative
enforcement actions against individuals who 'cause' an issuer to violate Section 13(b)(2)."
Matthews, supra note 11, at 351 (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Triton Energy Corp.,
Litigation Release No. 15,266 (Feb. 27, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
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The accounting and record-keeping provisions do not actually define
what is meant by "records." The definition of records contained in the
Exchange Act is often used as the point of reference. It defines "books and
records" to include "accounts, correspondence, memoranda, tapes, discs,
papers, books, and other documents or transcribed information of any type,
whether expressed in ordinary or machine language. 107  However, that
definition does not provide guidance as to whether records totally unrelated
to the preparation of financial statements may still be implicated by the
accounting and record-keeping provisions.' °g
In the legislative history of the accounting and record-keeping
provisions, the Senate version was largely adopted in conference with the
only addition of the qualification that the accuracy of the record be in
"reasonable detail."10 9 In discussing the proposed legislation, the Senate
Report included a footnote suggesting the breadth of application of the
record-keeping provisions:
The phrase "disposition of its assets" is not intended as a limitation on the scope of the
requirement that accurate books and records be maintained. The issuer's
responsibility to keep records correctly reflecting the status of its liabilities and
equities is no less than its obligation to maintain such records concerning its assets.
The word "transactions" in the bill encompasses accuracy in accounts of every
character.
1 10
In implementing the FCPA, the SEC recognized that the accounting
and record-keeping provisions were "not exclusively concerned with the
litreleases/lr15266.txt; Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Triton Energy Corp., Litigation Release No.
15,396 (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr15396.txt; In
re Gore, Exchange Act Release No. 38,343 (Feb. 27, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/3438343.txt). The rule has been extended to "'outsiders' as customers and
suppliers." See Matthews, supra note 11, at 352 (citing In re Ngai King Tak, Exchange Act
Release No. 7443 (Aug. 28, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
3438988.txt; Sec. & Exch. Comm'n. v. Mangel, Litigation Release No. 15,465, (Aug. 28,
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrI 5465.txt; In re Kuntz,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,281, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2490 (Sept. 26, 1995); Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Excal Enterprises, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14,651 (Sept. 21, 1995), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Ir14651 .txt; In re Richard D. Russell, Exchange
Act Release No. 36,280, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2489 (Sept. 26, 1995)).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(37) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
108 For example, a question could arise as to whether a record not directly related to the
preparation of financial statements, such as records relative to the maintenance of equipment,
are subject to the accounting and record-keeping provisions. See infra note 115.
109 H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 917 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1950.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F.
Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The only express congressional requirement for accuracy
is the phrase 'in reasonable detail."').
110 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 7 n.5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
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preparation of financial statements.""' It noted that "[a]n equally important
objective... [was] the goal of corporate accountability.""
2
Commentators are in accord that, at the very least, the record-keeping
provisions apply to records that are relevant to the preparation of financial
statements. 13 However, there is case law that states that "Congress' use of
the term 'records' suggests that virtually any tangible embodiment of
information made or kept by an issuer is within the scope of section
13(b)(2)(A) of the FCPA, such as tape recordings, computer print-outs, and
similar representations."' 14
No categorical statement can be made as to what records are beyond
the purview of the record-keeping provisions. The particular circumstances
will ultimately dictate what records are subject to their terms. 115 But in
general, the greater the degree to which a record may relate to the
preparation of financial statements, the adequacy of internal controls, or the
performance of audits,116 the more courts are likely to find the record to be
III Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4.
H12 Id.
113 See Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,959 (Feb. 15, 1979); STEPHEN F. BLACK & ROGER M. WITTEN, COMPLYING WITH
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT § 6.03[l], at 6-7; ABA Symposium, Practical
Implications of the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and
Recent Developments: A Program by Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1713, 1726-30 (1980) (comments of Edward D. Herlihy, Assistant Dir., See. & Exch.
Comm'n. Div. of Enforcement); Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara George, Historical Analysis
of the Accounting Standards of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REv.
499 (1980); Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara George, Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate
Management Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 865 (1980);
Matthews, supra note 11, at 353 (citing Guide, supra note 102, at 313); Siedel, Internal
Accounting Controls Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Federal Law of
Corporations?, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 444, 459-65 (1981).
"14 World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 748-49.
115 As an example, without some relationship to the preparation of financial statement,
records relating to the maintenance of equipment are less likely to fall within the scope of the
record-keeping provisions. However, that assessment could dramatically change if the
maintenance costs were significant or if the nature of the maintenance being performed was
essential to ensuring the reliability of equipment vital to the operation of a business. Cf id.
at 749 ("As a practical matter, the standard of accuracy in records will vary with the nature
of the transaction involved.").
116 Cf S. REP. No. 95-114, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098 ("The
purpose of the [accounting and record-keeping provisions is to strengthen the accuracy of the
corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process ...."). Given Sarbanes-
Oxley's emphasis on internal controls and deterring conduct that might impede or affect the
audit function, see supra Section II, by inference Congress has reaffirmed the broad scope of
records subject to the terms of the accounting and record-keeping provisions.
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subject to the terms of the record-keeping provisions.' 17 Records such as
corporate minutes, transactional documents, authorizations for expenditures
are all incidental to the preparation of financial statements or recording
economic events.' 18 They also directly relate to internal controls and audits
of financial statements.
Consistent with the statute's accounting and record-keeping
provisions," 9 Rule 13b2-1 contains no materiality requirement. 10 Rule
13b2-1 provides "an independent basis for enforcement action..., whether
or not violation of the provisions may lead, in a particular case, to the
dissemination of materially false or misleading information to investors.' 12'
"Even if the amount of a payment would not affect the 'bottom line' of an
issuer in quantitative terms, it could still constitute a violation of the record-
keeping provisions if not accurately recorded. The record-keeping
provisions apply to all payments, not merely sums that would be material in
the traditional financial sense. 122
This represents a dramatic departure from the traditional approach
taken by U.S. securities laws. Historically, except for disclosures as to
certain aspects of an issuer's activities,' 23 materiality was the overriding
consideration as to what required disclosure and what constituted a
violation. But as a result of the record-keeping provisions, relatively
insignificant amounts of money, if not properly recorded, can have serious
ramifications. 124
Similarly, the manner in which information is entered into an issuer's
records can become very important under Rule 13b2-1. Manipulating an
entity's books or records to mask transactions by characterizing them in
some oblique way, or by actually falsifying a transaction, can lead to
117 BLACK& WITTEN, supra note 114, § 6.03[l] at 6-8.
118 Id.
119 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2005).
120 World-Wide Coins Inv. Ltd, 567 F. Supp. at 749.
121 Promotion of Reliability of Financial Information, supra note 4.
122 DEMING, supra note 3, at 22.
123 For example, until the adoption of the FCPA, one of the relatively few exceptions to
the materiality requirement related to related-party transactions involving family members.
Item 404(a) of Regulation S-K provides that any transaction worth over $60,000 involving a
director or his immediate family must be disclosed. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2005).
124 When a violation of the anti-bribery provisions may be involved, the SEC has "zero"
tolerance when record-keeping violations are also involved. Gregary S. Bruch, Assistant
Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the American Conference
Institute's Ninth National Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Program (Dec. 3, 2001).
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serious exposure for an issuer and those individuals involved. 125  For
example, placing a transaction into an abnormal category or "burying" it in
some other way could serve as a basis for an enforcement action for a
violation of Rule 13b2-1.126
2. Rule 13b2-2
Rule 13b2-2 prohibits any officer or director from making materially
false or misleading statements or failing to state any material facts in the
preparation of filings required by the Exchange Act. 127  Officers and
directors of an issuer, or anyone acting on their behalf, are prohibited from
"taking any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead
any independent public or certified accountant engaged in the performance
125 While the provisions of Rule 13b2-1 have broad application to the books and records
of an issuer, "enforcement officials have less tolerance for inaccurate records that may bear
more directly on compliance obligations of an issuer." DEMING, supra note 3, at 23. The
context in which a record may have been falsified, such as concealment of a violation of law
or the true financial status of an issuer, will be critical factors in a determination as to
whether enforcement action will be taken for a violation of Rule 13b2-1. DEMING, supra
note 3, at 23; cf infra notes 126, 144 and accompanying text.
126 Facilitating payments provide a classic example of the interplay between the
accounting and record-keeping provisions and the anti-bribery provisions. For example,
facilitating payments, which are permitted under the anti-bribery provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005), could pose a problem if not
accurately described. An effort to conceal facilitating payments by placing them among
other types of payments would be improper. DEMING, supra note 3, at 23. It is the improper
classification that would be false and which could serve as a basis for a violation.
If a facilitating payment represents a relatively small amount of money and has no
relationship to any particular function of an entity, its inclusion in a category of
miscellaneous items may not be inappropriate. Id. at 24. Its classification is not necessarily
inaccurate or false. "Similarly, the degree to which the facilitating payments may be rolled
up into larger line items and thereby hidden is not necessarily improper as long as the
manner in which such payments are incorporated into a larger line item is logical and not for
the purpose of concealing questionable transactions." Id. The classification is not
necessarily false or inaccurate. It is mere circumstance that leads to the facilitating payment
being, in effect, "buried." But should the payment be incorrectly classified so that it may be
rolled up into a larger line item and thereby concealed, then there may be a basis to allege a
violation of the record-keeping provisions. Id.
Considerations relative to adequate internal controls also relate to facilitating
payments. Id. If the facilitating payments are not properly approved or recorded, an issuer
opens itself up to possible allegations of inadequate internal controls. Id. Indeed, for an
issuer extensively engaged in international business, the failure to have a compliance
program may constitute a violation of the internal control provisions of the accounting and
record-keeping provisions. See infra note 166.
127 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b) (2005).
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of an audit of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of
rendering such financial statements materially misleading.q
12 8
While this rule applies only to officers and directors, it extends to
written and oral statements made to internal auditors as well as to outside
auditors.1 29 It also extends to "causing another person to make a material
misstatement or make or cause to be made a materially false or misleading
statement."'130  Not only are misrepresentations covered, but a material
omission or failure to clarify a statement so as not to make it materially
false or misleading can constitute a violation of Rule 13b2-2.
B. THE INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS PROVISIONS
To enhance corporate accountability and ensure that boards of
directors, officers, and shareholders of issuers are aware of and thus able to
prevent the improper use of an issuer's assets, the accounting provisions
require issuers to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that
" transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;
" transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
128 15 U.S.C § 7242; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b). For the purposes of the Exchange Act
and rules promulgated thereunder, "the term 'officer' means a president, vice president,
secretary, treasury or principal financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer,
and any person routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any
organization whether incorporated or unincorporated." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gallagher,
No. 87-3904, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9556, at *22 n. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
129 In implementing Rule 13b2-2, the SEC limited the application to officers and
directors but declined to limit its application to written statements. Promotion of Reliability
of Financial Information, supra note 4. It should be added that the combination of
management's disclosure obligations under Rule 13b2-2 and an auditor's obligation to
inquire under § 10A of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1, and Statement of Auditing Statements ("SAS") No. 99, Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards, 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 316 (2005) [heinafter AU], "may
effectively eviscerate the protections of the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work
product doctrine, and other similar protections." DEMING, supra note 3, at 381. If auditors
are carrying out their responsibilities under § 10A and SAS No. 99, audits must be designed
to detect illegal conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1; AU § 316.15. Questions can be expected to be
asked as to whether management has knowledge of illegal acts and as to where illegal
conduct is most likely to occur. AU at § 333.06. Since management controls the attorney-
client privilege, "it is presented with the dilemma of disclosure of unfavorable information,
and its consequences, or facing civil and possibly criminal charges for violating Rule 13b2-2
for failing to make required disclosures." DEMING, supra note 3, at 381.
130 17 C.F.R § 240.13b2-2.
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accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and to maintain accountability for assets;
" access to company assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and
" the recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken
with respect to any differences.'
l3
The purpose of an accounting control system is to ensure that entities
adopt accepted methods of recording economic events, protecting assets,
and conforming transactions to management's authorization. 132  The
accounting provisions do not mandate any particular kind of internal
accounting controls. 33 The standard for compliance is whether a system,
taken as a whole, reasonably meets the statute's objectives. 1 34 "Reasonable
assurance" of management control over an issuer's assets means "such level
of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs."'1 35 "Like the record-keeping provisions, the
internal controls provisions are not limited to material transactions or to
those above a specific dollar amount. ' 36  However, "the prudent man
qualification" was adopted in 1988 in order to clarify that accounting and
record-keeping provisions do not "connote an unrealistic degree of
exactitude or precision."'
' 37
131 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
132 See H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120.
133 See id. There is therefore a natural and intended interplay between the anti-bribery
and the accounting and recording-keeping provisions. See S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. "An effective system of internal accounting controls
includes a range of review and approval guidelines designed to detect and to deter
questionable payments. Indeed, the planning, implementation, and monitoring of an issuer's
compliance program should be closely linked if not intertwined with its system of internal
accounting controls." DEMING, supra note 3, at 351.
134 DEMING, supra note 3, at 25.
135 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
136 See. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
137 H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 917 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120, 1950.
"The concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of
relevant factors, including the costs of compliance." Id.
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VI. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-KEEPING
PROVISIONS
Both the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice may bring actions for
violations of the FCPA. 38 The SEC, with regulatory authority over issuers,
may bring civil actions for violations of the anti-bribery provisions and for
violations of the accounting and record-keeping provisions.' 39  The
Department of Justice may prosecute criminal violations of the FCPA and
may bring civil actions against individuals and entities that are not subject
to the SEC's jurisdiction. 40  An issuer's employees and agents can be
prosecuted regardless of whether the company has been charged or
convicted. 141
A. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The accounting and record-keeping provisions have been used to
buttress charges under the anti-bribery provisions.1 42  The critical factor
138 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11-12.
139 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(2)(B), 78u, 78u-3.
140 Id. §§ dd-2(d), dd-3(d); see, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11-12.
141 Matthews, supra note 11, at 323. Similarly, an entity's acquittal does not necessarily
exonerate an individual who may be charged with the same offenses. Previously, under the
anti-bribery provisions, there was a provision, commonly referred to as the "Eckhardt
amendment," which precluded a finding of liability on the part of an individual if the entity
was not also charged and convicted. United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir.
1984). "A major objective of the Eckhardt amendment [was] to allow the employee the
benefit of the superior resources of the corporation in presenting a defense in the criminal
proceeding; a closely related objective is to prevent the employer from making its employee
a scapegoat." Id. The Eckhardt amendment was repealed as part of the 1988 amendments.
H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 923.
142 In a recent case, United State v. Titan Corp., Titan pled guilty to violating both anti-
bribery and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA as well as to assisting in the filing of a
false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2000). Plea Agreement, United States v.
Titan Corp., No. 05CR0314 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005), reprinted in 5 BUSINESS LAWS, INC.
(FCPA) 699.9287. Titan was an issuer which, along with its subsidiaries, was involved in
constructing wireless telephone systems in certain developing countries. Id. 1. The
subsidiaries, including foreign subsidiaries, "shared employees, officers, and personnel with
Titan" and, with the knowledge of Titan, entered into a business relationship with the
President of Benin's business advisor. Id. 3, 7-8. Titan failed to conduct any formal due
diligence regarding its agent in Benin "before or after engaging him." Id. 7. It also made
payments without any evidence that the services were actually performed or the expenses
actually incurred. Id. 10. At the direction of one senior Titan officer based in the United
States, Titan funneled approximately $2 million, through its agent in Benin, towards the
election campaign of Benin's President. Id. 17-23, 30. Titan made the payments to assist
its development of a telecommunications project in Benin and to obtain the Benin
government's consent to an increase in the percentage of Titan's project management fees
for that project. Id. 4, 6. Titan violated the record-keeping provisions by falsely
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with the accounting and record-keeping provisions is that the transaction
need not be material.143  In almost every instance, it is unlikely that the
payment of bribes will be accurately reported. For this reason, the
Department of Justice can be expected to look to the accounting and record-
keeping provisions when investigating and ultimately charging an issuer for
violating the anti-bribery provisions.
1 44
One practical consideration in prosecuting violations of the anti-
bribery provisions is the difficulty in securing evidence in a foreign setting.
This difficulty is further complicated by whether such evidence would be
admissible in a U.S. court. However, in the context of prosecuting a
violation of the record-keeping provisions, the evidence is more likely to be
documentary in nature and to be in the possession of an issuer subject to
compulsion by U.S. enforcement authorities.
Even more important, proving a violation of the record-keeping
provisions is more straightforward and more likely to succeed than proving
a violation under the anti-bribery provisions. The evidence necessary to
establish a violation is much simpler and less likely to confuse a jury.
Unlike the anti-bribery provisions, there is no need to prove "corrupt
intent," to prove whether a "foreign official" was involved, or to prove
whether a promise, offer, or payment was made to "obtain or retain
business." In large part, the elements of the offense are limited to whether
the record is subject to the record-keeping provisions, whether the conduct
was willful, and whether the record was accurate in reasonable detail. 1
45
In other contexts, prosecutors have historically preferred charges for
making false statements to the government because they are much easier to
prove to a jury. 14 6 The evidence required to prove a false statement is likely
to be much more clear cut and less susceptible to differing interpretations.
The evidence is also likely to be documentary in nature and therefore less
dependent upon recollections that can be subjective and that can fade over
characterizing the payments to its agent in Benin as "social payments." Id. 30.
143 Supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
144 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 ("Under the accounting section no off-the-books accounting
fund could be lawfully maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no
improper payment could be lawfully disguised.").
145 Cf. United States v. Wilson, No. 01 CR. 53 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572, at
*19 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001).
146 There are five elements to proving a false statement to a federal agency in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000): (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the statement is false or
fraudulent; (3) the statement is material; (4) the defendant made the statement knowingly
and willfully; and (5) the statement pertained to an activity within the jurisdiction of a
federal agency. E.g., United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (6th Cir. 1991).
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time. Similarly, in tax prosecutions, the filing of a false tax return is much
easier to prove than tax evasion.
14 7
But unlike a case involving false statements to the government or the
filing of a false tax return, charging a criminal violation of the record-
keeping provisions is extraordinarily potent. From a prosecutor's
perspective, a criminal violation of the record-keeping provisions has an
added strategic advantage because it carries a far more severe penalty. A
prosecutor does not need to complicate his or her case with additional
charges, like money laundering, 148 in order to secure leverage for
negotiations concerning cooperation or the entry of a plea.
In their own right, the FCPA's record-keeping provisions provide a
completely independent basis for prosecuting those involved in making
improper payments. 149 No requirement exists for violations of the record-
147 Proof of the filing of a false return only requires proof that the person filing the return
believed that it "was not true and correct as to every material matter." 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
(2000). In contrast, tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000), requires proof of willfulness, the
existence of a tax deficiency, and an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted
evasion of the payment of the tax. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
148 For example, a violation of one of the money laundering statutes where a violation of
the FCPA can serve as a predicate act can lead to a term of imprisonment of 20 years. 18
U.S.C. § 1956 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
149 In United States v. Cantor, Information, Case No. 01 CR 687 (S.D.N.Y., July 18,
2001), reprinted in BusINEss LAWS, INC. (FCPA) § 699.821601, the former president of
American Banknote Holographics, Inc. ("ABNH"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of American
Banknotes Corporation ("ABN"), an issuer, was charged with conspiring to inflate the
reported financial condition of ABN and ABHN, id. 9 1-34, with falsifying books and
records, id. 9 35-36, with making false statements to auditors, id. 37-38, and with
conspiring to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Id. N 37-54. The conspiracy
to inflate ABN's and ABNH's financial condition arose from actions taken by ABN,
ABNH's former parent, to artificially inflate ABNH's profits prior to ABNH's initial public
offering. Id. 12. ABN caused ABNH to record revenue for sales that did not actually
occur or that were incomplete at the time they were recorded, i.e., "bill and hold" sales. Id.
13, 35-36. To ensure that these sales were included in ABN's and ABNH's financial
reports, Cantor and others deceived ABN's and ABNH's independent auditors with false
representations and fabricated corporate records. Id. 13, 37-38. In terms of the
conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, ABNH was informed by its
foreign sales agent in Saudi Arabia that he needed additional funds to pay "consultancy fees"
in connection with ABNH's bid to print holographs to be applied to Saudi currency. Id.
46. Cantor believed that a portion of the fees would be paid to Saudi officials. Id. 47.
After ABNH's bid was approved by the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Cantor approved
the transfer of $239,000 to a Swiss bank account for the "consultancy fee." Id. 49-50.
Cantor pled guilty to all four counts. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Weissman, Civil Action No.
01 CV 6449, Litigation Release No. 17,068A (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17068a.htm. The SEC filed related complaints
and administrative actions involving securities fraud and violations of the anti-bribery and
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keeping provisions to be charged in conjunction with a violation of the anti-
bribery provisions or in conjunction with other violations of U.S. law. 50
The record-keeping provisions can and do play a critical role in buttressing
charges of violations of statutes other than the anti-bribery provisions.
They are particularly used to compliment charges involving accounting and
other forms of financial fraud.' 5 ' While the record-keeping provisions have
accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA with respect to Cantor, ABN,
ABNH, and others. Id.
150 In United States v. Rothrock, Daniel Ray Rothrock, an officer of the Cooper Division
of Allied Products Corporation ("Allied"), an issuer, pled guilty to a single count of violating
the record-keeping provisions for preparing a "bogus" invoice in the amount of $300,000.
Plea Agreement, United States v. Rothrock, No. SAOICR343OG (W.D.Tex. June 13, 2001),
reprinted in 3 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 699.818801. In 1991, the Cooper Division
entered into a contract to sell work over rigs to RVO Zarubezhneftestroy ("Nestro"), a
government-owned purchasing agency in Russia. Id. At that same time, an agreement was
reached to pay a sales commission of $282,076 to Trading & Business Services, Ltd.
("TBS"), an entity jointly-owned by Comco Holding, A.G. ("Comco"), a Swiss company,
and Nestro. Id. This payment was for the ultimate benefit of Nestro. Id. A day after the
sales commission was paid, the Cooper Division obtained the rig contract from Nestro. Id.
Knowing that no consultation fee or market study had been or would be provided by TBS,
Rothrock later delivered to TBS a draft of a $300,000 invoice for a "consultation fee and
market study." Id. The draft invoice was in reality a mechanism for disbursing Allied funds
to TBS. Id. Rothrock received an invoice similar to the draft invoice from an Austrian
company with which the Cooper Division had no contract or relationship. Id. Following the
signing of the second contract with Nestro for additional rigs, Rothrock, using the bogus
invoice from the Austrian company, had the Cooper Division issue a check to the Austrian
company for $300,000. Id. It was in reality an invoice from TBS. Id. While the
circumstances suggested a possible violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the record-
keeping provisions was ultimately used as the mechanism to address the questionable series
of events.
151 In United States v. Kbnigseder, a European sales executive of Informix was charged
with making materially false and misleading statements to Informix's auditors in violation of
Rule 13b2-2, falsifying books and records in violation of Rule 13bl-2, and wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). Indictment 25-29, United States v. K6nigseder, Cr.
00-0517 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5. 2000). The misstatements to Informix's auditors took place in
the course of Informix's efforts to determine the scope of its restatement of earnings. Id.
18-22. Konigseder was alleged to have approved a number of "sham" sales transactions in
1996 in order to meet financial targets, including approving and ratifying secret side letter
agreements in connection with software sales contracts that made revenue recognition on
those contracts improper. Id. 15-17. He also approved and signed purported "sales
contracts" that mischaracterized the underlying transactions so that the Informix could
record revenue, even though no sales were taking place. Id.
In United States v. Bergonzi, in connection with a financial accounting fraud at
McKessonHBOC, the accounting and record-keeping provisions were used as the basis for
criminal charges. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Bergonzi, No. CR 00-0505 MJJ
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2001). The company was formed in 1999 by the merger of McKesson
Corp. and HBO & Company ("HBOC"). Id. 3. The superseding indictment against the
former co-presidents and co-chief operating officers of HBOC alleged that, prior to the
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been used primarily in the context of situations when material
misstatements or omissions in financial statements are involved, 52 no such
requirements exist in order to charge a violation of the record-keeping
provisions. 153
Especially when records are falsified so as to conceal a violation of
statutes other than the anti-bribery provisions, the record-keeping
provisions can and do play a strategic role in being among the charges
brought. The record-keeping provisions have been used in conjunction with
allegations of violations by defense contractors,1 54 of public corruption
within the United States,155 kickbacks, 156 concealing an off-the-books
account, 157 and commercial bribery. 58
merger, HBOC management systematically defrauded HBOC shareholders and the investing
public by fraudulently inflating HBOC's financial results. Id. 11-14.
Millions of dollars in revenue were generated by contracts that had side-letter and
recourse agreements that were withheld from the company and concealed from the outside
auditors. Id. passim. Fraudulent entries were recorded and misstatements were made to
auditors in order to conceal the scheme. Id. passim. In addition to, among others, securities
fraud and mail and wire fraud, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, this series of
events served as the basis for alleging violations of Rule 13b2-2 for false representations to
the auditors, of Rule 13b2-1 for record-keeping violations, and of the internal accounting
controls provisions of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). Id. passim.
152 See Zarin, supra note 50, at 3-7.
153 Increasingly, enforcement actions in a criminal context are taken in the absence of
material misstatements or omissions in financial statements. Cf, e.g., supra notes 153-54;
infra notes 157-61.
154 The record-keeping provisions came into play in United States v. UNC/Lear Services,
Inc. ("UNC"), where military parts and services were supplied to Saudi Arabia by UNC on a
foreign military sales contract awarded by the U.S. government. Statement of Facts 1-2,
United States v. UNC/Lear Services, No. 3:00-cr-00031 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 8, 1999), reprinted
in 2 BusINEss LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 600.050. A Kentucky firm served as UNC's
subcontractor and a Saudi consulting firm acted as UNC's and the subcontractor's agent in
Saudi Arabia. Id. 3, 5. The subcontractor enlisted the aid of UNC's contract manager to
create the appearance of a competition to meet procurement regulations, thereby enabling the
subcontractor to inflate the cost of the parts. Id. 9-14. In addition, the contract included a
"handling fee" to cover UNC's costs associated with the performance of the contract. Id.
4. Contrary to UNC's representations as to it not having any agents working on the contract,
the subcontractor sent fictitious invoices to UNC for "in country engineering services" to
secure payments for the Saudi consultant. Id. 8. UNC violated the record-keeping
provisions by falsely recording the payments as fees for engineering services. Information,
Count Three, United States v. UNC/Lear Services, No. 3:00-cr-00031 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 8,
1999), reprinted in 2 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 600.053. In addition to the record-
keeping violations, UNC pleaded guilty to mail fraud and to submitting false statements to
the U.S. government. Plea Agreement 2, United States v. UNC/Lear Services, No. 3:00-cr-
00031 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 8, 1999), reprinted in 2 BUSINESS LAws, INC. (FCPA) § 600.053.
155 In United States v. Crop Growers Corp., the record-keeping provisions were used to
support charges of public corruption within the United States. 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C.
1997). As an outgrowth of the investigation of former Secretary of Agriculture Michael
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Espy, the Independent Counsel charged a U.S. issuer, Crop Growers Corp., and two of its
officials with a scheme to violate the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. at 340. To conceal
the improper contributions, among the charges were alleged violations of the record-keeping
provisions for making and keeping false books and records, for falsifying accounting
records, for making false statements to auditors, and for failing to disclose material facts to
auditors. Id. at 340, 352.
The charges relative to violating the record-keeping provisions were dismissed due to
the absence of proper venue. Id. at 352-54. The act of falsifying the records took place
outside the state and district in which the charges were brought. Id. Ironically, the options
for venue are greater for crimes committed outside of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. §
3238 (2000).
156 In United States v. Scharf, as part of a kickback scheme, Scharf, an officer of an
issuer arranged with a sales representative to pay inflated sales commissions in exchange for
receiving as a kickback substantial portion of the commissions. Information, United States
v. Scharf, No. Cr-84-76 (N.D. Ohio 1984), reprinted in 3 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA)
696.72. He pled guilty to mail fraud, tax evasion, and to violating Rule 13b2-2 for making a
false statement to auditors. Daily Report, Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section,
D.J. No. 113-57-37, reprinted in 3 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 696.72. He stated in
writing that the "[c]ompany is not aware of any transactions which could be considered a
violation of SEC Rule 13B-2 [which] ... rule relates to ... the question of illegal corporate
payments and practices." Information, Part D, 2.
157 In United States v. Duquette, Numex Corporation, an issuer, maintained a bank
account which was not reflected in its books and records. Information, Part IV, 16, United
States v. Duquette, No. H-84-64 (D. Conn. 1984), reprinted in 3 BusINESS LAWS, INC.
(FCPA) 696.74. Numex used the account to divert payments it had pledged to a commercial
lender as collateral for a financing loan. Id. Officers of Numex disguised the diversion of
monies by recording false entries in Numex's books and by altering photocopies of customer
invoices and checks which were provided to the lender. Id. 17. When Numex's
accountants discovered the off-the-books account, the officers prepared bank statements for
the accountants which failed to reflect most of the transactions in the account. Id. 19.
When the accountants tried to confirm the information contained in the false bank
statements, the defendants intercepted the confirmation and caused one of their employees to
falsify the information contained in the confirmation form and forge the signature of a bank
official. Id. 21. The officers later presented the falsified bank statements and other
corporate records to the SEC. Id. 24. The objects of the conspiracy included a securities
law violation, record-keeping violations, and obstruction of justice. Id. Part II.
158 In United States v. Thomson, the charges stemmed from the participation by officers
of HealthSouth in a scheme to bribe the director general of a Saudi Arabian foundation to
secure an agreement to provide staffing and management services for a 450-bed hospital in
Saudi Arabia. Indictment T 6-7, United States v. Thomson, No. CR-04-J-0240-S (N.D.Ala.,
July 28, 2004), reprinted in 3 BUSINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 699.907400. The director
general solicited a $1 million payment from HealthSouth, ostensibly as a "finder's fee." Id.
7 9. Against the advice of counsel, id. 10, the officer agreed to pay the director general
$500,000 per year for five years in return for his agreement to execute the contract on behalf
of the Saudi Arabian foundation. Id. 12 (Count 1). To facilitate the arrangement, officers
arranged for the director general to execute a sham consulting contract with a HealthSouth-
affiliated entity in Australia. Id. 15-16 (Count 1). A conspiracy was alleged, id. Count 1,
in addition to violations of the Travel Act by using the facilities of interstate commerce to
promote unlawful activity, namely commercial bribery in violation of Alabama law, id.
Count 2, and of the FCPA's record-keeping provisions by causing HealthSouth's books,
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In contrast, the accounting provisions are rarely used in the context of
criminal proceedings. What constitutes adequate internal controls is, by
nature, a very esoteric determination. It can be subject to a myriad of
interpretations that would be confusing to lay persons and even to persons
of considerable expertise. 5 9 The result is that, except for the most
egregious situations, violations of the accounting provisions relating to
internal controls are not likely to be charged.
B. CIVIL ACTIONS
The standard of proof in a civil enforcement action is a preponderance
of evidence as opposed to the reasonable doubt standard applicable in a
criminal enforcement context. This distinction represents a substantial
reduction in the nature and quantum of evidence required to establish a
violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions. Of even greater
significance is the absence of scienter for civil liability. But the penalties
and sanctions associated with a civil violation are considerably less than
when there is a criminal conviction.
While countless actions were brought over the years under the
accounting and recording-keeping provisions in contexts in which the
bribery of foreign officials was not involved, the SEC demonstrated little
interest in the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and brought few such
actions. 160  Almost all of the enforcement activity resided with the
Department of Justice. 161 However, in recent years, the SEC has signaled a
renewed interest in focusing its investigatory efforts on the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA.
162
records and accounts to falsely and fraudulently reflect that the payments made to fund the
sham consulting contract were made for legitimate purposes. Id. (Counts 3 and 4).
159 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751
(N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The main problem with the internal accounting controls provision of the
FCPA is that there are no specific standards by which to evaluate the sufficiency of controls;
any evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective process in which knowledgeable individuals
can arrive at totally different conclusions.").
160 See, e.g., DEMING, supra note 3, at 41; Matthews, supra note 11, at 305.
161 DEMING, supra note 3, at 41.
162 The renewed interest was first evidenced in Sec. & Exch. Comm 'n. v. Triton Energy
Corp., where the SEC filed a civil injunctive action against Triton Energy as well as senior
officers of Triton Indonesia, Inc. ("Triton Indonesia"), a subsidiary of Triton Energy.
Litigation Release, No. 15,266 (Feb. 27, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr15266.txt. The officers authorized improper payments to an agent of Triton
Indonesia who was acting as an intermediary with Indonesian government agencies.The
payments were made despite "knowing or recklessly disregarding the high probability" that
the payments would be passed along to Indonesian government employees for the purpose of
influencing their decisions affecting the business of Triton Indonesia." Id. The payments
STUART H. DEMING
Yet, in almost every case where an issuer was involved, the accounting
and record-keeping provisions served as the critical link in addressing the
underlying bribery that is alleged to have taken place. 163 The provisions
have even been employed in situations where a foreign issuer has engaged
in bribery within its own country. 164 Ultimately, whether an action is
were falsely recorded as routine business expenditures. Id While Triton Energy did not
expressly authorize or direct the improper payments and "misbookings," it was alleged to
have failed to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls to detect and
prevent the improper payments. Id. In a related administrative proceeding, In re David
Gore, Robert Puetz, William McClure, and Robert P. Murphy, senior officers of Triton
Energy were found to have caused Triton Energy to violate the anti-bribery and record-
keeping provisions for failing to take action after learning of potentially unlawful conduct.
Exchange Act Release No. 383,343, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9262 (Feb. 27,
1997), reprinted in BUStNESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) § 699.470.
163 A cease-and-desist order was entered in In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc., for
Chiquita's violations of the accounting and record-keeping provisions in connection with a
payment to foreign customs officials by Banadex, Chiquita's wholly-owned Columbian
subsidiary. Administrative Proceeding, File No. 3-10613, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1463 (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-44902.htm. Banadex employees authorized payments of approximately $30,000
to local customs officials to secure renewal of a license at Banadex's port facility in
Columbia. Id. One payment was incorrectly identified as a maritime donation, and the other
was incorrectly identified as relating to a maritime agreement. Id. Even though the
payments were made without the knowledge or consent of Chiquita officials outside of
Columbia and even though the payments were made in violation of Chiquita's strict policies,
Chiquita was found responsible for ensuring that its wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries
complied with the accounting and record-keeping provisions. Id. Through Banadex's
employees, Chiquita violated the record-keeping provisions by maintaining books and
records that inaccurately reflected Banadex's transactions and disposition of assets. Id.
Chiquita violated the internal control provisions by failing to maintain a system of internal
accounting controls to ensure that Banadex's books and records accurately and fairly
reflected the disposition of its assets. Id. A critical factor in the action taken by the SEC
was Chiquita's failure to take remedial action after its "internal auditing staff made
management aware of a number of instances in which Banadex had not provided
documentation required by Chiquita's internal accounting control procedures regarding
discretionary expenses." Id.
164 In Sec. & Exch. Comm 'n. v. Montedison, S.p.A., an Italian firm was involved with the
bribing of Italian politicians. Litigation Release No. 15,164 (Nov. 21, 1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl5l64.txt. However, the SEC did not have a
jurisdictional basis to pursue violations of the anti-bribery provisions since there were no
"fund or instructions" emanating from the United States. Matthews, supra note 11, at 324.
Yet, since Montedison had ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the SEC had
jurisdiction to file suit under the jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. Montedison was
charged with defrauding the investing public by misstating its financial condition and results
of operations in periodic reports filed with the SEC by concealing hundreds of millions of
dollars of payments that, among other things, were used to bribe politicians in Italy. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n. v. Montedison, S.p.A., Litigation Release No. 16,498 (Mar. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl6948.htm; Litigation Release No.
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brought by the SEC will rest largely upon the nature and severity of the
underlying conduct that is concealed by inadequate internal controls or
inaccurate records. As is the case in a criminal context, an SEC
enforcement action for a violation of the accounting and record-keeping
provisions does require that it be brought where there are allegations of
major financial fraud. 1
65
The internal controls provisions provide an almost endless series of
bases for the SEC to take action against an issuer.166 This is particularly so
15,164. Its controls were so deficient that no one was able to reconstruct precisely what
occurred and who was responsible. Release No. 15,164. Among the charges were
allegations of violating the internal control provisions and creating and maintaining false
books and records. Id. Its "accounting policy did not require that any documentation be
submitted to support the disbursement of corporate funds." Id. A settlement was ultimately
reached in 2001 when Montedison paid a civil penalty of $300,000. Release No. 16,948.
165 In United States v. KPMG-Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, for the first time the
Department of Justice and the SEC filed a joint injunctive action against KPMG-Siddharta
Siddharta & Harsono ("KPMG-SSH"), a public accounting firm in Indonesia and Sonny
Harsono, a partner with KPMG-SSH, which is an affiliate of KPMG International.
Litigation Release No. 17,127 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr17127.htm. To reduce a tax assessment, Harsono authorized the payment of a
bribe by KPMG-SSH to an Indonesian tax official for one of KPMG-SSH's clients, an
Indonesia client owned by Baker Hughes, PT Eastman Christensen ("PTEC"). Id The
authorization was conditioned upon the direct approval of Baker Hughes. Id. To conceal the
improper payment, Harsono had KPMG-SSH prepare a false invoice for services that were
not rendered. Id. PTEC paid the invoice and thereby entered the transaction on its books
and records as a payment for professional services. Id. A civil injunctive action was also
filed against the CFO and controller of Baker Hughes for authorizing the payment of a
$75,000 bribe through KPMG-SSH in violation of the anti-bribery and accounting and
record-keeping provisions. Id The CFO and controller were alleged to have directed the
payment to KPMG-SSH. Id. In addition to finding that Baker Hughes had authorized the
improper payment by KPMG-SSH in the accompanying administrative proceeding against
Baker Hughes, it was also found that senior managers of Baker Hughes authorized payments
to its agents in India and Brazil without making adequate inquiry as to whether portions of
the payments were being given to foreign officials. In re Baker Hughes Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 44784 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
44784.htm. With respect to the latter payments, there was also a finding that Baker Hughes
did not fairly and accurately record the payments. Id.; see also supra notes 57, 84, 162-65
and infra note 168.
166 Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Accounting and Record-
Keeping Provisions, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND OECD CONVENTION:
MITIGATING AND MANAGING RISKS IN THE CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT B-7 (ABA-CLE
2001) (citing Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks at the ABA's National Institutes on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Feb. 19,
1999 and March 12, 1999)). As an example, in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n. v. Titan, among the
allegations in the complaint against Titan, the SEC alleged that Titan failed to devise or
maintain an effective system of internal controls to prevent or detect FCPA violations.
Litigation Release No. 19,107 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lrl 9107.htm.
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in the context of civil enforcement where, as opposed to criminal
enforcement, proof of intent is not required. The FCPA and especially its
internal control provisions will always be applied in hindsight.' 67 In such
situations, the internal controls will rarely be found to be adequate. 1
68
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING AND RECORD-KEEPING
PROVISIONS
Any analysis of the FCPA must bear in mind that its provisions have
rarely been subject to judicial scrutiny.' 69 Though the FCPA has had, and
will increasingly have, a major impact on how business is conducted,
relatively few prosecutions have been brought under the anti-bribery
provisions. Of these, most have resulted in the entry of a guilty plea or
some sort of civil settlement.' 70  While far more prosecutions have been
Despite utilizing over 120 agents and consultants in over sixty counties, Titan never had a
formal company-wide FCPA policy, failed to implement an FCPA compliance program,
disregarded or circumvented the limited FCPA policies and procedures in effect, failed to
maintain sufficient due diligence files on its foreign agents, and failed to have meaningful
oversight over its foreign agents.
Id.
167 DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A
GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET PLACE 29 (2d ed.
1999).
168 One such rare exception involved a cease-and-desist proceeding in 2000 with
International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM") and its wholly-owned subsidiary in
Argentina, IBM-Argentina, S.A. ("IBM-Argentina"). Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Int'l Bus.
Mach., Litigation Release No. 16,839 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lr16839.htm. The enforcement action was premised upon violations of
the books and records provisions of the FCPA for "presumed illicit payments to foreign
officials." Id. No violations of the internal control provisions were alleged. See id. In
connection with a $250 million contract to modernize the computer system of a commercial
bank owned by the Argentine government, IBM-Argentina entered into a $22 million
subcontract with an Argentine subcontractor which, in turn, was alleged to have passed on
$4.5 million to officials of the Argentine bank. Id. The order, issued in the accompanying
administrative proceeding, found that IBM-Argentina's management "overrode IBM's
procurement and contracting procedures"; "hid the details of the subcontract" from the
technical and financial review personnel assigned to the contract; and "fabricated
documentation, including a backdated authorization letter and a document that stated
incomplete and inaccurate reasons for hiring [the subcontractor]." In re Int'l Bus. Mach.
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 43,761 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-43761.htm. IBM-Argentina recorded the payments as third-party
subcontractor expenses which were, in turn, incorporated into IBM's 1994 Form 10-K. Id
The order further noted that IBM's policies and procedures had been circumvented and that
no employee of IBM in the United States was aware of what had transpired. Id.
169 See DEMING, supra note 3, at 6.
170 Id.
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brought under the accounting and record-keeping provisions, most have
been in the context of civil proceedings initiated by the SEC and, even in
that context, the vast majority of cases have resulted in settlements.'
71
A multitude of legal issues associated with the FCPA have accordingly
not been subject to judicial review. The anticipated upsurge in prosecutions
can be expected to lead to rather extensive litigation at both the trial and
appellate levels) 72  While entities are generally not inclined to contest
enforcement actions, this will not be the case with individuals subject to
long terms of imprisonment.173 Increasingly, incarceration is more likely
and more severe for white-collar crime.' 74 "As a result, the basic
underpinnings of the FCPA, as well as the application of its provisions, will
be subject to more and more challenges with the anticipated increase in
criminal prosecutions."'
' 75
Situations are likely to arise where courts will interpret the FCPA
differently from how it has been applied by the Department of Justice and
the SEC.17 6 However, until the countours of the accounting and record-
keeping provisions are more clearly defined, the prudent approach in
providing guidance to clients is to rely on historical interpretations as
applied by U.S. enforcement officials. 77 The advice provided should be
designed to deter conduct that is apt to serve as a basis for an
'71 See 2 BUsINESS LAWS, INC. (FCPA) 260.001-260.211.
172 Among the factors prompting the anticipated upsurge in prosecutions includes the
continuation of the renewed interest on the part of the SEC in enforcing the anti-bribery
provisions as well as the added impetus given to enforcement of the accounting and record-
keeping provisions by Sarbanes-Oxley. In addition, provisions in each of the anti-bribery
conventions relating to cooperation and exchange of information will increasingly remove
obstacles to obtaining evidence in foreign settings. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra
note 2, art. 9; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. XIV; CoE Criminal Law
Convention, supra note 2, arts. 25-26; U.N. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 43, 46, 48-50.
173 See DEMING, supra note 3, at 6.
174 While the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker eliminated the mandatory nature
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, they will continue to be treated as advisory by federal
courts in the United States. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Sarbanes-Oxley also proposed the
enhancement of the sentencing guidelines for white-collar crime. Sarbanes-Oxley, supra
note 31, §§ 805, 905, 1104; 116 Stat. at 802, 805-806, 808-809. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission subsequently recommended a series of enhancements. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM., INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 1-15 (Jan.
2003) (report to 108th Congress), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r congress/S-
Oreport.pdf.




investigation. 78 "If an investigation arises, and charges are brought, a host
of legal issues can still be legitimately raised."'
179
Over time the accounting and record-keeping provisions can be
expected to become a staple in the charges brought by federal prosecutors to
address a wide range of conduct associated with white collar crime. They
provide an incredibly potent tool in a prosecutor's arsenal. A truly effective
compliance program must therefore include proper record-keeping and
adequate internal controls. 80  The manner in which the accounting and
record-keeping provisions were intended to operate in tandem with the anti-
bribery provisions, and other statutes, must always be kept in mind in
designing, implementing, and monitoring a compliance program.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Even for entities that are not issuers, a compliance program must ensure that records
are accurately recorded and that the internal controls are effective. Charges like those
associated with assisting in the filing of a false tax return in Titan demonstrate how
inadequate internal controls and accurate records can expose entities not subject to the
accounting and record-keeping provisions to serious criminal charges. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n. v. Titan, Litigation Release No. 19,107 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19107.htm.
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